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Case No. 920407-CA
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VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS
COMPANY,
Defendant, Third-Party
Plaintiff, and Appellant,
vs.
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO.,
DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES,
PETER T. LIN, and W. JAMES PALMER,
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Third-Party Defendants
and Appellees
BRIEF OF APPELLEES-THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS
DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES,
PETER T. LIN, AND W. JAMES PALMER
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of Utah under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp.
1992).
Utah

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1992), and

Code

Ann.

§78-2a-3(2)(k)

(Supp.

1992),

this

Court

has

jurisdiction over this appeal by reason of the transfer of this
action from the Supreme Court of Utah to the Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.
apply

Does the Proprietary/Governmental Function distinction
to

agencies

of

the

State

of

Utah,

as

opposed

to

municipalities?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
as in the instant action, the Court reviews the facts in a light
most favorable to the losing party.

In deciding whether the trial

court properly granted judgment as a matter of law, the Court gives
no deference to the trial court's view of the law, but reviews it
for correctness. Mountain States Tel, v. Garfield County, 811 P. 2d
184, 192 (Utah 1991) .
2. Does the definition of governmental function found in Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (1989) apply to the instant action?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
3. Are the challenged actions of the state defendants done in
furtherance of an essential core function of government?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
4.

Did the trial court correctly dismiss the third party

plaintiff's state law causes of action due to his failure to file
an undertaking as required by § 63-30-19 (1989)?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is tne same as

that for the first issue, supra.
5.
Division

Were Mr. Karren's state law tort claims against the
of

Water

Resources

and
2

its

employees

in

their

representative capacities properly dismissed based on the retention
of immunity found at § 63-30-10 (1989)?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
6.

Were Mr. Karren's state law negligence claims against

state officers Lin and Palmer correctly dismissed pursuant to the
immunity provided by § 63-30-4(4) (1989)?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
7.

Did Mr. Karren fail to state a cause of action for fraud?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
8.

Did Mr. Karren fail to state a cause of action for

malicious conversion of property?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
9.

Did Mr. Karren fail to state a cause of action for

interference with prospective economic relations?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
10.

Did Mr. Karren fail to state a cause of action for

interference with contractual relations?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
11.

Does a private, non-statutory, civil, cause of action

exist to redress alleged violations of Article 12, Section 19 of
3

the Utah State Constitution?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
12.

Did Mr. Karren fail to state a cause of action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against state officers Lin and Palmer?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
13. Was the State of Utah's sovereign immunity waived for Mr.
Karren's contract claims?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
14. Was Mr. Karren, doing business as Rock Products, a thirdparty beneficiary of the State of Utah's contract with Richards
Irrigation Co.?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (1989):
(4)(a) "Governmental function" means any act,
failure to act, operation, function, or
undertaking of a governmental entity whether
or not the act, failure to act, operation,
function, or undertaking is characterized as
governmental, proprietary, a core governmental
function, unique to government, undertaken in
a dual capacity, essential to or not essential
to a government or governmental function, or
could be performed by private enterprise or
private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed
by any department, agency, employee, agent, or
officer of a governmental entity.

4

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 (1989)
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff
shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by
the court, but in no case less than the sum of
$300, conditioned upon the payment by the
plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the
governmental entity in the action if the
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action' or
fails to recover judgment.
Utah Code Ann. S 63-3Q-10(1)(a), (b), (d)-(f) (1989)
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the
discretion is abused; or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment,
false
arrest,
malicious
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of
process, libel, slander, deceit, interference
with contract rights, infliction of mental
anguish, or civil rights; or . . .
(d) arises out of a failure to make an
inspection or by reason of making an
inadequate or negligent inspection of any
property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or
prosecution of any judicial or administrative
proceeding, even if malicious or without
probable cause; or
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the
employee whether or not it is negligent or
intentional; . . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant,

Third-Party

Plaintiff, Ves

A.

Karren, doing

business as Rock Products Company, filed the instant third party
complaint against the State of Utah's Division of Water Resources,
two state employees, Richards Irrigation Co., and the owners of the
real property serviced by Richards Irrigation Co..
5

R. 485-767.

Upon the state third party defendants motion for summary judgment1
(R. 813-884), the matter was dismissed as to the state defendants.
R. 1773-1777. Since that time the action has continued against the
other parties, but has now been concluded.

R. 2502-2504.

Third

Party Plaintiff now brings the instant appeal only from the
dismissal of the state defendants.

R. 2507-2508.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Defendant,

Third-Party

Plaintiff, Ves

A.

Karren, doing

business as Rock Products Company, entered into an agreement with
the Plaintiff, Richards Irrigation Co., to install a pressurized
water system for Richards.

R. 490, para. 9.

Richards Irrigation Company, through a separate agreement, had
contracted with the State of Utah's Board of Water Resources for
the State of Utah to partially (85%) finance the construction of
Richard's irrigation system. R. 873-884. Pursuant to its contract
with Richards, the State of Utah engineered the water system.
507, para. 58.

R.

The specifications prepared by the State of Utah

were included as part of the contract between Richards and Karren,
the appellant.

R. 492, para. 12.

As of the date of Karren's third party complaint, Karren, dba
as Rock Products Company, had been paid $438,248.85 under his
construction contract with Richards.

R. 494, para. 16. Richards

Irrigation

the

Co. possesses

and

uses

1

irrigation

system

in

While styled a Motion to Dismiss, the State Defendants
Motion included materials outside of the pleadings and was properly
treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

6

question.

R. 505, para, 21.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Mr. Karren, doing business as Rock Products Co., was hired by
Richards Irrigation Co. as a contractor to install a pressurized
water system for Richards. When Karren and Richards disputed how
much money was due for the work, Richards brought the instant
action against Karren.

Karren brought the amended third party

complaint at question, not only against Richards, but also against
the State of Utah's Division of Water Resources and two state
employees.
Though the actions of the state defendants were governmental
in nature, Karren never filed the requisite undertaking.

The

various tort causes of action Karren brought against the Division
all fall within one or more of the exceptions to waiver of immunity
found in § 63-30-10 (1989). The negligence actions against the two
state employees also fail due to the immunity provided for state
officers.
Karren sought to raise four causes of action against the two
state

officers

alleging

fraud

and

malice, in

an

effort to

circumvent their immunity, but failed to state a cause of action
upon which relief could be ordered on any of those four claims.
While Karren had no contract with the State of Utah, he sought
to circumvent the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by claiming he was
a third party beneficiary of the Board of Water Resources (a nonparty) contract with Richards Irrigation.

Karren is not such a

beneficiary and his contract claims were properly dismissed.
7

Karren sought to bring an action directly under Article 12,
Section 19 of the Utah State Constitution, even though the very
-language of that provision declares that the legislature would have
the power to determine how it should be enforced. The legislature
has created a criminal enforcement procedure for the provision at
question, and no civil cause of action such as Karren's exists.
Karren's efforts to raise a contractual dispute with Richards
to the level of a constitutional violation was correctly dismissed
by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT ACTION
A.
The Proprietary/Governmental Function Distinction
Does Not Apply to the State of Utah and its Agencies
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act broadened the liability of
governmental entities. See Standiford v. Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d
1230, 1235 (Utah 1980) (recognizing principle).

Before the Act's

adoption, however, the State was absolutely immune from tort
liability at common law.

See Wilkinson v. State, 134 P. 626, 630

(Utah 1913) ("in the absence of either express constitutional or
statutory authority an action against a sovereign state cannot be
maintained"); Campbell Bldq. Co. v. State Road Comih'n., 7 0 P. 2d
857, 861 (Utah 1937) ("action may not be maintained [against the
State Road Commission] unless the State has, through legislative or
constitutional

action, given consent to be sued");

State v.

District Court, 78 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1937) ("the state cannot be
sued unless it has given its consent or has waived immunity");
8

Bingham v. Board of Education, 223 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1950)
("without legislative enactment we are unable to impose any
liability or obligation upon [departments of the state]").
In arguing that the Governmental Immunity Act does not apply,
Third Party Plaintiff argues that the actions of the State of Utah
in question were proprietary in nature, and therefore not entitled
to immunity at all. This argument fails because the State of Utah
has never been held to act in a proprietary manner.

Its actions

have always been considered governmental functions that were immune
from suit at common law.
The proprietary/governmental function distinction, at common
law, was applied

only to municipal corporations, which were

regarded as having a dual character and were accorded immunity only
when acting as an agent of the state, i.e., in a governmental
capacity, rather

than as a private corporation, i.e., in a

proprietary capacity.

See Note, Tort Claims Against the State of

Utah, 5 Utah L. Rev. 233, 236-37 (1956); Crowder v. Salt Lake
County, 552 P.2d 646, 647 (Utah 1976) ("prior to 1965, actions for
negligence could not have been maintained against the State or its
political subdivisions for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe
or

dangerous

condition

of

any

road

or

bridge

except

municipalities"); Bingham v. Board of Education, 223 P. 2d 432, 435
(Utah 1950) (recognizing dual character of municipal corporations
and stating that " [i]f the city should be regarded as a state
agency at all times, . . . there would exist no logical ground for
holding it liable for damages due to negligence, since in no
9

instance is a state held liable under the general principles of
law").

See also Hale v. Port of Portland, 783 P.2d 506 (Or. 1989)

(holding damages cap conflicted with state open courts provision as
applied to municipality, but not as applied to state); Prosser and
Keaton, The Law of Torts, pp. 1043 & 1051 (5th ed. 1984) (at common
law

state

entities

were

absolutely

immune

from

suit, while

municipalities were granted immunity only for governmental, as
opposed to proprietary, activities); Restatement of Torts § 887,
comment c (1939) (only the state has complete immunity from tort
liability; municipal corporations are immune only for governmental
functions).
Thus, to the extent Mr. Karren (appellant) seeks to apply the
proprietary/governmemtal function distinction to a state entity in
this matter, third party plaintiff has erred.
Immunity

Act

applies

to

the

instant

The Governmental

action,

including

the

procedural requirements such as the need to file an undertaking
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 (1989)
B. The Definition of Governmental Function Found at Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) is Applicable to the Instant
Action
As originally enacted, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act did
not include a definition of the term "governmental function." This
state of affairs led the Supreme Court of Utah to state that "the
governmental-proprietary classification system has had a checkered
history before this Court."
1980).

Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah

In its 1987 General Session, the Utah State Legislature

took strong measures to reaffirm, clarify, and resolve the disputes
10

over what the meaning of "governmental function" should be. Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) was amended to read:
(4)(a) "Governmental function" means any act,
failure to act, operation, function, m or
undertaking of a governmental entity whether
or not the act, failure to act, operation,
function, or undertaking is characterized as
governmental, proprietary, a core governmental
function, unique to government, undertaken in
a dual capacity, essential to or not essential
to a government or governmental function, or
could be performed by private enterprise or
private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed
by any department, agency, employee, agent, or
officer of a governmental entity.
Mr.

Karren

(Rock

Products)

claims

that

this

statutory

definition of governmental function should not apply to the instant
action because, while it was enacted before the filing of the
instant action, the cause of action arose before the effective date
of the statute.

While citing several cases on this question, Mr.

Karren has failed to cite to the decision of the Utah Supreme Court
that is controlling.

Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).

Frank involved a previous attempt by the legislature to
correct

the Supreme Court's efforts to interpret the phrase

"governmental

function."

The statute at question

in Frank,

declared that all government health care facilities were to be
considered to be fulfilling governmental functions.

As in the

instant action, the statute at question in Frank was enacted after
the cause of action had arisen.
While the amended reenactment of the provision
in
question
was
not
made
expressly
retroactive, and the present action arose
prior to its passage, we are disinclined, a-s a
matter of judicial policy, to disregard the
11

obvious manifestation of legislative intent
reflected in the amendment.
Id. at 519.

The trial court correctly reached the same result in

the instant action.

The legislature, by passing a clear and

precise definition of "governmental function," has provided an
obvious manifestation of its intent.

As in Franks that intent

should not be ignored, but should be followed. The 1987 amendment
to Section 63-30-2 is the Legislature's first formal definition of
function."2

"governmental

It

reflects

the

Legislature's

longstanding view that "governmental function" should be construed
broadly, and that exceptions to immunity be narrowly and strictly
construed*
Because

all of the complained

of actions

of the state

defendants fall within the statutory definition of "governmental
function"

that

Governmental

has

been

provided

by

the

legislature,

the

Immunity Act applies to all of the third party

plaintiff's state law causes of action.
C. The Challenged Actions of the State Defendants Were
Essential to the Core of Governmental Activity
Even disregarding the definition of "governmental function"
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (1989), the challenged
activities of the State of Utah's Division of Water Resources were
the exercise of a governmental function.

Utah is a dry state in

which water is a scarce and very important resource.
2

"The

In 1987 (as noted in Frank) and again in 1984 and 1985, the
Legislature amended Section 63-30-3 to clarify that governmental
health care, and floodwater and natural-disaster management are
governmental functions, but Section 63-30-2(4) is the first formal
definition of governmental function.
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conservation of water and power resources of the state for the
benefit of the people is unquestionably a governmental function of
great importance•"

Petition of Board of Directors, 86 P.2d 460,

464 (Or. 1939) (sovereign immunity not at issue).

If the water of

the State of Utah were not properly managed by the appropriate
governmental agencies over public water resources, vital needs
would suffer.

The essential role of government is to forestall

such problems.
Utah Code Ann. § 73-10-1 (1989) sets forth the Utah State
Legislature's policy declarations of the governmental need to
provide funding and assistance to build water projects, such as the
one in question in the instant action, that would more frugally use
the scarce water resources of the state and permit conservation of
those resources. Indeed, the legislature has stated that projects
such as the one at issue were necessary to provide for the economic
growth of the state.

Utah Code Ann. § 73-10a-23(l) (1989).

The challenged actions of the Division of Water Resources, and
its employees, were in furtherance of a necessary governmental
function, as determined by the Utah State Legislature.

For this

reason, also, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act applied to the
instant action.
II. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S STATE LAW CAUSES
OF ACTION WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH THE UNDERTAKING REQUIREMENTS OF
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACTf S 63-30-19
Third Party Plaintiff's state law claims are subject to Utah
Code Ann. §63-30-19 (1989), which provides:
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff
13

shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by
the court, but in no case less than the sum of
$300, conditioned upon the payment by the
plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the
governmental entity in the action if the
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or
fails to recover judgment.
Where, as here, suit is brought against an agency of the State
of Utah, and its employees, a condition precedent to bringing suit
is the filing of the statutorily mandated undertaking.

If this is

not done, suit is barred.
While not binding upon this Court, the State of Utah calls
this Court's attention to the decision of the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Rippstein v. City of Provo, 929 F.2d 576 (10th Cir.
1991).

In Rippstein, the federal appellate court held that the

undertaking required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 must be filed
contemporaneously with the complaint in order to be timely filed
under this statute. Because the plaintiff in Rippstein did not so
file an undertaking, but only sought to file one at a later time,
the action was dismissed.

The Court held that the failure to file

could not be remedied by an attempt to file an undertaking late.
At no time in the instant action, did third party plaintiff
seek to file the required undertaking.

For this reason, the third

party plaintiff's claims against the State of Utah third party
defendants were properly dismissed.
III. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S STATE TORT LAW
CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THE DIVISION OF WATER
RESOURCES WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BASED ON THE
IMMUNITY OF THE STATE PROVIDED BY THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, S 63-30-10
Third party plaintiff's state law causes of actions can be
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divided into two groups; contract claims and tort claims. The tort
claims raised by the third party plaintiff include; negligent
misrepresentation, intentional trespass (conversion of property),
fraud, and interference with contractual rights.

The Division of

Water Resources is, pursuant to § 63-30-10 (1989) entitled to
immunity on all of these claims.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the
discretion is abused; or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment,
false
arrest,
malicious
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of
process, libel, slander, deceit, interference
with contract rights, infliction of mental
anguish, or civil rights; or . . .
(d) arises out of a failure to make an
inspection or by reason of making an
inadequate or negligent inspection of any
property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or
prosecution of any judicial or administrative
proceeding, even if malicious or without
probable cause; or
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the
employee whether or not it is negligent or
intentional; . . . .
Third

Party

Plaintiff's

claims

that

a

state

defendant

negligently and intentionally misrepresented facts on which Karren
relied clearly falls within the retention of immunity of § 63-3010(1) (f)

(1989).

Any

claim

that the conduct

of

the state

defendants interfered with the contract rights of the third party
plaintiff falls within the retention of immunity of § 63-3010(1)(b) (1989). Any claim that the state defendants conspired to
15

convert the property of the third party plaintiff falls within the
retention of immunity of § 63-30-10(1)(b) (1989) for injuries
arising out of intentional trespass. Any claim for fraud against
the state defendants falls within the retention of immunity of §
63-30-10(1)(b) (1989) for injuries arising out of deceit.
The Governmental Immunity Actf Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et
seq., does not contain a waiver of immunity for intentional torts
(such as fraud, intemtional trespass, etc.).

Any claims that the

third party plaintiff was damaged as a result of intentional torts
cannot state a claim against the State of Utah, or its Division of
Water Resources.
Because the Division of Water Resources is immune from the
third party plaintiff's state tort law causes of action, the state
employees in their representative capacity are also immune.
Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4) (1989).

Utah

For these reasons, Mr. Karren's

state tort law claims against the Division and the state employees
in their representative capacities were properly dismissed.
IV. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S STATE TORT LAW
CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST PETER T. LIN AND W.
JAMES PALMER, EMPLOYEES OF THE DIVISION OF
WATER RESOURCES WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BASED
ON THE IMMUNITY PROVIDED BY THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, S 63-30-4 AND
BECAUSE THE THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THESE THIRD
PARTY DEFENDANTS
Pursuant to § 63-30-4(4) (1989), third party defendants Lin
and Palmer can only be sued in their personal capacities if they
have personally acted, or failed to act, due to fraud or malice.
The only causes of action in the third party complaint that allege
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such fraud or malice against one or both of these defendants are:
First Cause of Action for conspiracy to defraud against Lin, Fourth
Cause of Action for conspiracy to convert property'against Lin,
Seventh Cause of Action for interference with prospective economic
relations against Palmer, and the Ninth Cause of Action for
tortious interference with contractual relations against Palmer.
All other causes of action against these defendants were properly
dismissed due to the immunity that these defendants enjoy.
In determining whether a complaint states facts upon which
relief may be granted, courts consider only the facts alleged; and
the facts must be stated with particularity to show how they
constitute a cause of action. Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 991
(Utah 1962).

As a matter of law, third party plaintiff has failed

to state a cause of action against third party defendants Lin and
Palmer as to these four cause of action that do allege fraud or
malice.
In seeking to avoid his duty to plead with particularity, Mr.
Karren relies upon Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for
the proposition that he only needed to provide notice.
reliance is misplaced.

This

Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure expressly states that "in all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be
stated with particularity."

See also, Heathman, supra, and DeBrv

v. Valley Mortgage Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Utah App. 1992).
A.

Conspiracy to Defraud.

The allegation of "fraud" is a legal conclusion entitled to no
17

deference against a motion to dismiss, Heathman, supra, and Mr.
Karren failed to state a cause of action because the elements of
fraud are absent.
A claim for fraud requires:

(1) That a representation was

made; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which
was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false,
or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge
upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party,
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact
rely upon jLt; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury
and damage.

Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126

(Utah 1982) .
Mr. Karren's first cause of action fails to state several
elements of fraud.

The alleged misrepresentation (presence of an

inspector to measure sand being used) was not "material" because is
was not part of the contract. Karren had no right to rely upon the
representation because the contract called for no inspector to be
present.

The purpose of the alleged representation (presence of

the inspector) was not to induce Karren to act differently from how
he would otherwise have been required to at.

Karren's reliance

thereon was not reasonable.
B.

Conspiracy to Convert Property.

Karren claims that Richards Irrigation Co. converted his
property by trying to use the system that Karren had installed for
Richards.

The system runs underground to the lands owned by
18

Richards shareholders, and irrigates those lands. Somehow, Karren
claims that a state employee was a malicious participant to this
effort at conversion.

Karren had installed the water system for

Richards, it was never his intent to use the system himself.
Karren has failed to state a cause of action.

The system, once

installed, became a fixture on the land, and Karren. owns none of
that land. By analogy, under Karren's theory, every contractor who
built an addition onto an existing structure, would become the
owner of the addition.
C.

Interference with Prospective Economic Relations

Karren's claim for interference with prospective economic
relations is based on the claim that Mr. Palmer, a state employee,
removed Karren's company, Rock Products, from the Division of Water
Resources

"pre-qualified

potential

contractor

list."

The

prospective economic relations allegedly interfered with were with
the very state agency whose conduct is challenged.
The first mortal problem with this claim is that the action
only allegedly removed third party plaintiff from a list of prequalified contractors, leaving Mr. Karren free to qualify, bid, and
receive contracts.
Next, the alleged "conduct is not actionable . . .

if the

defendant only acted to protect his own legitimate interests."
Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel., 709 P.2d 330, 337
(Utah 1985).

Even assuming the purpose Karren alleges for the

letter, it was done only to resolve a continuing problem between
Karren and Richards concerning a water project in which the State
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of Utah had an interest. It was a legitimate action to protect the
State of Utah's interests and resources and to get the project
finished and the dispute settled.
Finally, since the letter was not alleged to have been
disseminated to third persons, it did not harm Karren regardless of
its purpose.

That is, the letter did not interfere with Karren's

economic relations because no one else knew about it. Karren's own
allegation is that the letter's purpose was to bring about a
resolution of the disputes between Karren and Richards Irrigation not to injure Karren's prospective economic relations.

Such an

intent is not improper.
D.

Interference with Contractual Relations

This claim fails for the same reasons stated above in subpart
C.

The alleged state conduct was to protect legitimate state

interests, and therefore is not actionable.

Atkin, 709 P. 2d at

337.
In addition, Karren can state no claim here because Karren
admittedly had no contract that was interfered with.

Karren

instead alleges that he would have been able to enter into a
contract but for the state action.

There can be no interference

with a contract, if there is no contract. Restatement (Second) of
Torts, section 766 (1979); Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 602-03
(Utah 1962).
Further, "if a party has an interest to protect, he is
privileged to prevent performance of a contract which threatens
it."

Soter v. Wasatch Development Corp.y 443 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah
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1968).
The alleged incident was that Karren was unable to obtain a
contract as a subcontractor on a state project. The State was duly
concerned about working with Karren, because of the recent problems
on the Richards project. State financing and resources were again
involved, and the State of Utah had a legitimate interest to
protect. The state defendants' alleged interference was therefore
privileged.

Karren had no "right" to contract with the State of

Utah.
V. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 12,
SECTION 19 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
Karren's Thirteenth Cause of Action seeks to allege a private,
civil, cause of action for a purported violation of Article 12,
Section 19 of the Utah State Constitution, which stated:3
Every person in this State shall be free to
obtain employment whenever possible, and any
person, corporation, or agent, servant or
employee thereof, maliciously interfering or
hindering in any way, any person from
obtaining or enjoying employment already
obtained, from any other corporation or
person, shall be deemed guilty of a crime.
The Legislature shall provide by law for the
enforcement of this section.
Even disregarding sovereign immunity, Karren Has failed to
state a cause of action under this constitutional provision.
3

The

The last sentence of this section was stricken by a
constitutional amendment proposed in S.J.R. 7, Laws of 1992. This
amendment was approved by the voters of this state in the 1992
general election and took effect on January 1, 1993. The fact that
the legislature and the voters thought this sentence significant
enough to require its repeal, would indicate that it must be given
effect in actions which arose when the sentence was still in
effect.
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provision is not self executing.

It clearly calls upon the

legislature to provide for its enforcement.

The Legislature

responded by enacting criminal sanctions for violations of this
provision, not civil ones.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-24-1 & 2 (1988).

The Utah State Legislature, and not Mr. Karren, was given the
constitutional mandate to determine how to enforce Article 12,
Section 19.

That Mr. Karren wishes that the Legislature had

provided a civil remedy is of no consequence.
In an effort to avoid the plain language of the constitutional
provision he relies upon, Mr. Karren looks to federal law and
claims that the direct causes of action can be created under the
state constitution in the same manner as the United States Supreme
Court has created such actions under the federal constitution.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur, of Narc,
403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), the Court did, indeed, create
a federal cause of action directly under the constitution for
damages against a federal officer who violates an individual's
constitutional rights. At no time did Bivens create any cause of
action against state officers or employees.
Indeed, not all federal officers are susceptible to Bivens
actions.

In Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362

(1983), the Court refused to create a Bivens action' for enlisted
military personnel against their superior officers.

In reaching

this decision, the Court explained:
This Court's holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
supra, authorized a suit for damages against
federal officials whose actions violate an
22

individual's
constitutional
rights, eyen
though Congress had not expressly authorized
such suits.
The Court, in Bivens and its
progeny, has expressly cautioned, however,
that such a remedy will not be available when
"special factors counselling hesitation" are
present.
462 U.S. at 298. In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 19, 100 S.Ct. 1468
(1980) the Court explained that a second reason for not creating
such a direct cause of action judicially was where the legislature
had explicitly acted and created a substitute cause of action.
In the instant case, the Utah State Legislature has done just
that. The constitutional provision, at all times relevant hereto,
left its enforcement to the legislature. The legislature acted and
established a method by which this constitutional provision could
be enforced.
language

of

Mr. Karren asks this Court to disregard the plain
the

constitutional

provision,

disregard

the

legislature's establishment of a process to enforce this provision,
and to disregard the various special factors outlined above that
counsel hesitation.

This the Court should not do.

No private

civil cause of action can be stated pursuant to this constitutional
provision.
VI.
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF 42
U.S.C. S 1983 AGAINST LIN AND PALMER
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that not
every alleged injury arises to the level of a violation of a
constitutional right.

Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986);

Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986).

When presented with

civil rights claims that sound simply in tort or contract, courts
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should "bear in mind Chief Justice Marshall's admonition that 'we
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding,'"
Daniels, supra, at 665 (emphasis in original).
Karren does not even state sustainable tort and contract
claims, much less constitutional ones.

Karren simply alleges an

incomplete claim for fraud based on the underlying contract between
Karren and Richards Irrigation Co., and that the State of Utah
decided not to employ Karren in the future until prior contract
disputes with Richards had been settled.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Karren would have to
be able to show as a matter of law that the State "deliberately
deprived [Karren] of his constitutional rights,"
663 F.2d

778

(8th Cir. 1981).

Wade v. Havnes,

This Karren cannot do.

No

constitutional right of Karren has been violated.
Section 1983 does not make "every alleged injury which may
have been inflicted by a state official acting under 'color of law'
into a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ." Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544. The Constitution is not "a font of tort
law."

Id.

The Court "do[es] not think that the drafters of the

Fourteenth Amendment intended [it] to play such a role in our
society."

Id.
There is no basis here for a Section 1983 action.

In

Coastland Corp. v. County of Currituck, 734 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir.
1984), the court rejected a similar effort to raise a contractual
dispute with a county to the level of a constitutional claim.
Even if there were facts in the record under
which Coastland could be considered a third24

party beneficiary, there would be no process
due since a suit for breach of contract would
have provided Coastland with an adequate
remedy in state law.
"A mere breach of contractual right is not a deprivation of
property without constitutional due process of law.*

Otherwise,

virtually every controversy involving an alleged breach of contract
by a government • . . would be a constitutional case." Jiminez v.
Almodovar, 650 F.2d 363, 370 (1st Cir. 1981), citing Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976) (emphasis in original).
Karren does not have a constitutional right to be employed
by the State of Utah.

The State of Utah, looking at ongoing

problems between Karren and Richards Irrigation Co., did not
violate any constitutional right of Karren's by determining that
it would not contract with Karren until the prior disputes were
settled.

The same can be said of the allegations of state

complicity in the alleged fraud worked upon Karren by an employee
of Richards Irrigation.
VII. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF CANNOT MAINTAIN
ITS CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE
A. Sovereign Immunity has not been Waived for Karren's
Contract Claims.
One of the Legislature's few waivers of immunity
relates to State contracts.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (1989).

But it does not apply here.

That Section waives immunity only as

to the State's "contractual obligations]."

Since Karren has no

contract with any of the State Defendants, Rock cannot invoke
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that waiver/

The State's only contract was the one between the

Board of Water Resources ("Board") and Richards Irrigation
Company ("Richards").

Rock's contract was with Richards.

(The

contract between Richards and the Board will be called the "Board
contract," and the contract between Richards and Rock Products
will be called the "construction contract."

The Board contract

is in the record at R. 873-884)
The Legislature never intended to waive immunity under
Section 63-30-5 except as to one who has privity of contract with
the government, or who specifically is the contract's intended
beneficiary.

Karren enjoys no privity with the State, and was

not the reason the Board and Richards contracted.

Since Karren

has no enforceable rights under the Board contract, Karren cannot
use Section 63-30-5 to sue under that contract.

There has been

no waiver of immunity, and Karren cannot maintain its contractual
claims against the State Defendants.
B. Karren was not a Third-Party Beneficiary, and Lacks
Standing to Sue the State,
Karren seeks to make the State contractually liable merely
upon the self-serving legal conclusion asserted in paragraph 11
of his Complaint:

"Rock Products was a Third-Party beneficiary

under the Division fi.e., Board] Contract by virtue of becoming
the successful bidder and contractor with respect to the System."

A

Section 63-30-5 states:
"Immunity from suit of all
governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligation.
Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations shall not
be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12,
63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19."
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R. 492.

In addition to being barred by sovereign immunity,

Karren's claim contradicts all that the Utah Supreme Court has
said about third-party beneficiary rights.
As a matter of law, Rock Products and Mr. Karren were not
third-party beneficiaries.

"Third-party beneficiaries are

'persons who are recognized as having enforceable rights created
in them by a contract to which they are not parties and for which
they give no consideration.'"

Rio Alqom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618

P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980), quoting 4 Corbin on Contracts section
774 at 6 (1960).

The Supreme Court has strictly held a narrow

view of third-party claims.

"For a third-party beneficiary to

have a right to enforce a right, the intention of the contracting
parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit upon the thirdparty must be clear."

Rio Alqom, supra, at 506.

"A third-party

beneficiary who is incidentally benefited may not recover."

Id.

Rock Product was and is, at most, an incidental beneficiary
(the incidental benefit being only that Rock Product earned money
by working as the project contractor—but even that benefit
accrued under the construction contract, not the Board Contract).
Rock Product does not qualify.

To qualify as a third-party

beneficiary, the contract must be "intended to benefit him
directly."

Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453,

454 (Utah 1981).

One who is only incidentally benefited "may not

maintain an action against the promisor," .id, for "he is a
stranger to the promise and may assert no rights thereunder."
Tracy Collins Bank v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1982),
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citing Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21 Utah 2d 418, 446 P.2d 414
(1968), and Restatement of Contracts (2d) (hereinafter
"Restatement"), section 315 (1981).
Richards wanted to build a pressurized irrigation system,
and the Board agreed, under the Board contract, to partially
finance the system and to have the Division engineer it. The
project was planned, specifications were made, and bids for the
construction work were invited and received.

Karren, doing

business as Rock Products had his bid accepted, Rock' Products
signed its contract with Richards, and Rock Products began to act
as the contractor.
The purpose of the Board contract was to build an irrigation
system that Richards shareholders could use, and which would help
conserve the limited water supply available to the public.
Code Ann. § 73-10-1 (1989).

Utah

The Board contract absolutely did

not have the primary purpose of benefiting Rock Products.

(For

that matter, neither did the construction contract, to which Rock
Products was a party.)

In fact, when the Board contract was

executed, the parties were not even thinking of Rock Products,
much less intending to make Rock Products the contact's primary
beneficiary.

The Board contract was in place before bids were

invited, and long before it was known that Rock Products' bid
would be accepted.

In no way was Rock Products the primary or

intended beneficiary of the contract.
the hired worker.

Rock Products was simply

The Supreme Court's decisions roundly reject

the assertion that someone in Rock Products' place could be a
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third-party beneficiary entitled to enforce the Board contract.
Many of the Court's decisions quote or refer to the
Restatement, and, so far as we can tell/ each of those decisions
accords with the Restatement's summary of the law.
The Restatement distinguishes "an 'intended' beneficiary,
who acquires a right by virtue of a promise, from an 'incidental'
beneficiary, who does not."

Section 302, comment a.

The

definition of "intended" beneficiary is narrow, and anyone who
somehow benefits from a contract but who cannot qualify as an
intended beneficiary is automatically only an incidental
beneficiary.5
As the Restatement explains, "Performance of a contract will
often benefit a third person.

But unless the third person is an

intended beneficiary as here defined, no duty to him is created."
Restatement section 302, comment e.

And, "[a]n incidental

beneficiary acquires by virtue of the promise no right against

3

Restatement
section
Beneficiaries," states:

302,

"Intended

and

Incidental

(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition
of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to
effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a)

the performance of the promise will satisfy an
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the
beneficiary; or

(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends
to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an
intended beneficiary.
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the promisor or the promisee."

Restatement section 315.

Several illustrations under Restatement section 302 show
that Rock Product has no cause of action here.

See, e.g..

illustration 3 to comment b,6 and illustration 19 to comment e.7
And the Court in Schwinqhammer, supra, at 446 P.2d 416, offers
another analogous illustration in which the incidental
beneficiary was "held to have no right,"8 as does Mason v.
Tooele City, 26 Utah 2d 6, 484 P.2d 153 (1971), also discussed in

6

"B promises A to pay whatever debts A may incur in a
certain undertaking. A incurs in the undertaking debts to C, D and
E. If the promise is interpreted as a promise that B will pay C,
D and E, they are intended beneficiaries under Subsection (l)(a);
if the money is to be paid to A in order that he may be provided
with money to pay C, D and E, they are at most incidental
beneficiaries." (Emphasis added.)
7

"A contracts to erect a building for C. B then contracts
with A to supply lumber needed for the building.
C is an
incidental beneficiary of B's promise, and B is an incidental
beneficiary of C's promise to pay A for the building."
8

The Court stated:
"Corbin illustrates an 'incidental
beneficiary' in Section 779D, pp. 43-46, in the following language:
Where A owes money to a creditor C, or to several
creditors, and B promises A to supply him with money
necessary to pay such debts, no creditor can maintain
suit against B on this promise. The same is true in any
case where A is under a contractual duty to C the
performance of which requires labor or materials, and B
promises A to supply him such labor or material; C has no
action against B on this promise. In such cases the
performance promised by B does not itself discharge A's
duty to C or in any other way affect the legal relations
of C. It may, indeed, tend towards C's getting what A
owes him, since it supplies A with the money or material
that will enable A to perform, but such a result requires
the intervening voluntary action of A. B's performance
may take place in full without C's ever getting any
performance by A or receiving any benefit whatever. In
such cases, therefore, C is called an "incidental"
beneficiary and is held to have no right."
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the margin.
Rock Products also mentions Hamill v. Maryland Cas. Co., 209
F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1954), which applied New Mexico law and noted
that "an incidental beneficiary may not" recover.

Id. at 341.

Although that case found a third-party beneficiary, it is so
dissimilar that it does not help Rock.10
"Certainly [Rock Products] is entitled to no greater rights,
even viewing it as a third-party beneficiary, than it has as an
actual party," Rio Alaom, supra, at 506, and since the State
Defendants have not breached the Board contract with Richards,
Rock Products would have no cause of action even if it were a
third-party beneficiary.

Indeed, since Rock Products has no

contract with the State Defendants and is not a third-party
beneficiary, Rock Products lacks standing to sue. Moreover, Rock
Products has not even sued the State entity (The Board of Water

9

In Mason, the State and the city contracted to extend a sewer
line. The contract provided that it was "to enable the City and
adjacent City property owners to connect to this sewer line at
later dates.* * *" "Connections to the sewer line by ten (10)
private individuals will be authorized at the rate of $176.25 per
building unit, payable in advance for each connection." JIcl. at 484
P. 2d 154. That contract language specifically referred to third
parties like Mason (unlike the Board contract, which does not refer
to Rock). But the Court correctly held the contract was "between
the City and the Road Commission relating to covering the expenses
of the water and sewer lines between themselves, and there is
nothing therein shown expressing an intent that it was to benefit
the plaintiff or other users* * *." The Mason Court therefore
disallowed the third-party claim.
10

In Hamill, the third-party beneficiary, a surety, provided
bond to the parties upon the specific inducement of the contract
which constituted "an available asset . . . on which Maryland
relied when it executed the . . . bond." 209 F.2d at 341. This is
far different from the instant case.
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Resources) that contracted with Richards, Rock Products'
Complaint was properly dismissed and such dismissal should be
affirmed on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Karren's third party
complaint against the State of Utah's Division of Water Resources
and state officers Lin and Palmer.

The State Defendants urge

this Court to affirm the trial court's .order of dismissal•
Respectfully submitted this

/ ' 8 ^ d a y of March, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellees
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellees-Third Party Defendants Division
of Water Resources, Peter T. Lin, and W. James Palmer, postage
prepaid, to the following counsel of record on this the X
day of March, 1993:
DAVID L. BARCLAY
NATHAN R. HYDE
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
Attorneys for Appellant
50 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO., a
Utah corporation.
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
v.
VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS
CO., and INTEGON INDEMNITY CORP.,
Defendants.

VES A. KARREN dba ROCK PRODUCTS
COMPANY,
Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,

THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO.,
DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES,
PETER T. LIN, W. JAMES PALMER,
et al.,

Civil No. C87-2390
Judge David S. Young

Third-Party Defendants,

r*f *+i O

- 1 -
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On January 25, 1988, pursuant to notice, the Court conducted
a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss filed in this case by ThirdParty Defendants Utah Division of Water Resources, W. James Palmerf and Peter T. Lin ("State Defendants").
1.

Having carefully considered the pleadings, the memoranda

and cases submitted, and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds and holds that as a
matter of law Rock Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the
State Defendants.
2.

The Court concludes that the Utah Governmental Immunity

Act, Section 63-30-1 et seq. (U.C.A. 1953), bars every aspect of
Rock Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint against the State
Defendants.

The State Defendants' involvement in this case con-

stituted a governmental function, and there has been no relevant,
applicable waiver of immunity that would permit Rock Products to
maintain a cause of action against the State Defendants. Rock
Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint also fails to state a
claim for reasons of law independent of sovereign immunity.
3.

Rock Products has no contract with the State and is not

the intended beneficiary of a State contract, and therefore cannot maintain its contract claims. Also, since the State Defendants have no contractual obligation toward Rock Products, the
Section 63-30-5 waiver of immunity for contracts does not apply,
and Rock Products' contract claims are barred.
-

(

t *•*

4.

Rock Products1 tort claims do not state a cause of ac-

tion , and are also barred by immunity.

Sections 63-30-3; 63-30-

4; and 63-30-10.
5.

Rock Products1 constitutional and statutory and civil

rights claims fail because of sovereign immunity; and because
Rock Products has failed to state a claim; and because, on the
alleged facts, Rock Products cannot state a claim under the State
or federal statutes or the Utah Constitution or the United States
Constitution.
6.

As to the fifteenth cause of action. Rock Products has

failed to comply with the notice requirements of Sections 63-3011 and -12. The statutory time for compliance and for filing
additional claims has now expired.
7.

Rock Products has failed to comply with the bond require-

ment of Section 63-30-19.
Having concluded as a matter of law that Rock Products1 Amended Third-Party Complaint does not and cannot state a cause of
action against the State Defendants, and because Rock Products1
claims are barred by sovereign immunity,
THE COURT THEREFORE ORDERS:
The State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted.
Rock Products' Amended Third-Party Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice, for the reasons set forth in paragraphs 1-6.

THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
Judgment is hereby entered against Third-Party Plaintiff Rock
Products and in favor of Third-Party Defendants Utah Division of
Water Resources, W. James Palmer, and Peter T. Lin (the State
Defendants)•
DATED this JJ^a&y

of/Mk&pA. 1988.
BY THE COURT:

H. Di/iOti H ^ / i . i Y
CM*

^

a ra^L—

C*v*y Gwi<

'776-.

Deputy C*rk

P. KEITH NELSON [A2391]
DAVID L. BARCLAY [A0200]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Third-Party Plaintiff
50 South Main Street
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO.,

*

a Utah corporation,

*

Vs.

*
*
*
*

VES A. KARREN d/b/a ROCK
PRODUCTS CO., and INTEGON
INDEMNITY CORPORATION, a
foreign corporation,

*
*
*
*

Plaintiff,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
AND RULE 54 (b)
CERTIFICATION

*

Civil No. C87-2390

*

Defendants.

*

Judge David S. Young

*
*

VES A. KARREN dba ROCK
PRODUCTS COMPANY,

*
*
*

Defendant and
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

*
*
*
*

vs.

*

THE RICHARDS IRRIGATION CO.,
a Utah corporation, also
known as RICHARDS IRRIGATION
CO., et al.,

*
*
*
*

*

*

Third-Party
Defendants.

*
*

2502

Based upon the stipulation of Plaintiff, The Richards
Irrigation Company, its shareholders, Defendant Ves A. Karren dba
Rock Products Company, Defendant Integon Indemnity Corporation,
and third-party defendant Marvin L. Widerberg, and, in view of
the Court's prior Orders dismissing claims against other thirdparty defendants in these proceedings, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS
FOLLOWS:
1.

All causes of action in these proceedings against

The Richards Irrigation Company, against its shareholders,
against Ves A. Karren dba Rock Products Company, against Integon
Indemnity Corporation, and/or against Marvin L. Widerberg are
hereby dismissed with prejudice.

However, nothing in this order

or such dismissal shall preclude Mr. Karren or Integon from
asserting any defense or counter-claim against any stockholder or
director of The Richards Irrigation Company in the event such
stockholder or director subsequently files and/or pursues suit
against Mr. Karren or Integon arising out of the subject matter
of the within litigation, although this order is not intended to
consitute a determination that a stockholder or director would
have the right to file or pursue such a suit.
2.

Due to the foregoing dismissal, this order and all

other orders heretofore entered by this Court dismissing claims
against other parties in these proceedings are hereby certified,
2
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as of the date of this order and for purposes of appeal, as final
orders pursuant to Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
DATED this

(rAk day of

19 9^

The HtfrfdTable
David S. Young
D i s t r i c t Court JiJ

TO FORM:

for Plaintiff,
L. Widerberg, and
:ain designated
Third-Party Defendants

u
Dtfvid W. Slaughter
/ A t t o r n e y forj^ntegon Indemnity
^ Company
dlb\RP8.0RD
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AGREEMENT
This Agreement entered into this /;# day of /IP^H*
1985, by and
between the State of Utah, acting through the BOARD OF WATER RESOURCES, First
Party, sometimes referred to herein as the STATE, and the RICHARDS IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a corporation, organized under the Laws of the State of Utah, Second
Party, sometimes referred to herein as the WATER COMPANY:

W I T N E S S E T H
THAT WHEREAS, the Utah Legislature-has- authorized the BOARD DF WATER
RESOURCES, under Title 73-10 Utah Code Annotated, to enter into contracts for
the construction of water conservation projects which, in the opinion of the
Board, will best conserve and utilize the water resources of the State of
Utah; and

W

WHEREAS, the STATE desires to promote a water conservation project,
estimated to cost $375,000.00, and to provide 85% of the project cost from the
Conservation and Development Fund for construction of a dual sprinkle
/irrigation system, hereinafter referred to as the PROJECT and located in
Sections 27, 28, 28, 33, and 34, T2S, R1E, SLB&M in Salt Lake County, Utah;
and
WHEREAS, it is the desire of the WATER COMPANY to enter into a contract
with the STATE, for a consideration to be hereinafter provided, and to use the
water developed by the PROJECT, and as the WATER COMPANY has the available
manpower and facilities necessary to construct the PROJECT, and is ready,
willing, and able to enter into a contract for such purpose;
NOW THEREFORE, the Parties hereto enter into this agreement and make-the
following assignments:
1. The WATER COMPANY hereby agrees to convey, grant, and warrant to the gi
STATE, title, in fee simple as required, to the real estate upon which the s!
structures are to be constructed; and further agrees to convey, grant, and c^
warrant to the STATE, title to such easements and rights-of-way as shall be £
necessary to enable the STATE to construct, maintain, and operate the PROJECT,
o
2. The WATER COMPANY hereby agrees to convey, assign, and warrant to ;*•
the STATE, all right, title, and interest which it has or may have, to the {3
right to the use of the water which shall be developed or conveyed through the $£
use of the PROJECT, and particularly the waters of Little Cottonwood Creek as w
awarded to the Richards Irrigation Company in the Morse Decree No. 4802, dated
June 16, 1910, Union and East Jordan Irrigation Company vs. Richards
Irrigation Company, etal, in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah.

3. The WATER COMPANY recognizes as valid the conveyance of easements
and rights-of-way executed by various owners of the land to the STATE, and
agrees that all performance by the WATER COMPANY unoer this contract shall be
subservient to, and in recognition of, the aforesaid rights of the STATE in
and to the aforesaid easements and rights-of-way,
4. The
facilities and
of unforeseen
work items, a
part hereof•

WATER COMPANY agrees to supply the necessary manpower and
agrees to complete the construction of the PROJECT regardless
contingencies, in accordance with plans, specifications, and
copy of which is hereby incorporated by reference and made a

5. The STATE agrees to pay to the WATER COMPANY Eighty-Five Percent
(85%) of the total cost of constructing the PROJECT, but in no event shall the
amount paid by the STATE exceed Three Hundred Nineteen Thousand Dollars
($319,000.00), and the WATER COMPANY agrees to pay all costs in excess of the
amount paid by the STATE.
6. All payments made by the STATE to the WATER COMPANY under this
agreement shall be made payable to RICHARDS IRRIGATION COMPANY and mailed to
Marvin L. Widerberg, President, 7970 South Highland Dr., Salt Lake City, Utah
84121, Phone: 942-6412, or such person as may hereafter be designated by the
WATER COMPANY. The WATER COMPANY shall, during the construction period under
this agreement, establish in a bank of its choice, a special checking account
for the PROJECT, and all monies from any source to be used for payment of
obligations towards the construction work shall be deposited in this special
account and dispersed by check to meet the obligations of the PROJECT
construction. All items of labor and equipment shall be fully accounted for,
and once each month the WATER COMPANY shall send to the DIVISION OF WATER
RESOURCES a photocopy of each check issued from the said special account
during the month. A copy of each Bank statement shall also be provided to the
DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES.
7. It is further agreed that payment of the STATE1 S share of the
construction costs shall be made periodically to the WATER COMPANY upon the
presentation by the WATER COMPANY to the STATE of a certified statement of the
payment requirement which shall be in the nature of a partial estimate of the
work completed to date by the WATER COMPANY on each work item. The WATER
COMPANY shall withhold Ten Percent (10%) of each payment to the construction
contractor until Fifty Percent (5050 of the work has been completed, at which
time the remaining partial payments may be made in full, if the work is
progressing satisfactorily. " Also, . whenever the work is substantially
complete, the amount withheld may be further reduced. The amounts withheld as
set forth hereinabove shall be deposited by the WATER COMPANY in a separate
interest-bearing account, with the interest accruing to the benefit of the
contractors and subcontractors on a pro rata basis according to the work
performed by each. The withholdings and the interest earned thereon shall
become due and payable to the said contractors and subcontractors upon
satisfactory completion of the construction work under this agreement, or
sub-agreements, and upon final inspection and acceptance of the work by an
engineer designated by the STATE.
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8. It is further agreed that the WATER COMPANY shall complete the
construction of the PR0J£CT~on or before March 1, 1987, and that title to the
entire PROJECT, including all appurtenant facilities and water rights, shall
immediately vest in the STATE,
9. The STATE agrees to sell, and the WATER COMPANY agrees to purchase,
the land, easements, rights-of-way, water rights, the constructed works, and
all appurtenant facilities acquired by the STATE in this agreement and
Assignments at a total purchase price defined to be the combined total of all
funds paid by the STATE for the design and the construction of the PROJECT,
but not to exceed Three Hundred Nineteen Thousand Dollars ($319,000.00), plus
all expense incurred by the STATE for the investigation, engineering, and
inspection of the PROJECT, plus interest on this total amount at the rate of
Five Percent {5%).
Interest shall accrue on the outstanding balance from the
date of the first progress payment by the STATE. The actual cost of
investigation, engineering, and inspection shall be determined by the STATE
upon completion of the PROJECT.
10. The purchase price as defined above shall be payable over a period
of approximately Twenty (20) years, in annual installments as follows:
Annual installments in the amount of Twenty-Six Thousand Dollars
($26,000.00), or more, shall be due and payable on the First Day of March of
each year commencing on March 1, 1988, and continuing until the purchase
price, as defined above, shall have been paid in full. Said sums shall be
payable at the office of the DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, and shall be applied
first against the indebtedness incurred by the STATE for investigation,
engineering, and inspection until fully paid, and then to interest and
penalties and principal. Delinquent payments shall bear interest at a rate of
Eighteen Percent (18%) per annum.
11. During the purchase period, the WATER COMPANY may not change the use
of-any PROJECT water or facilities from irrigation to industrial, municipal,
or hydroelectric power generation without the written consent of the Board of
Water Resources.
The WATER COMPANY agrees that such consent may be
conditional upon an amendment to this agreement to reflect a higher interest
rate and/or a shorter repayment period for the outstanding balance due the
STATE under this agreement. The terms of the amendment shall be negotiable
between the Parties hereto*
12* During the period of such purchase under this contract, provided the
WATER COMPANY is not delinquent in any manner, the WATER COMPANY shall have
and is hereby given the right to use the STATE'S water rights, and all
facilities constructed thereunder. During the life of this agreement, the
WATER COMPANY agrees to assume, at the WATER COMPANY'S expense, the full and
complete obligation of maintaining the constructed works, and other
facilities, and of protecting all water rights, easements, and rights-of-way
from forfeiture, including the payment of any fees or assessments for said
water rights, easements or rights-of-way.

13. In order to secure the payment of the aforesaid purchase price, it
is hereby expressly agreed that the STATE may require the WATER COMPANY to
assess all outstanding shares of its stock for the full amount of any
delinquencies in the aforesaid purchase installments. It is further agreed by
the WATER COMPANY that it will not incur any mortgages or encumbrances, other
than those already acquired by it, on any of its property, real or personal,
without first securing the written consent of the STATE.
14. The WATER COMPANY hereby warrants the STATE that the construction of
the PROJECT will not interfere with existing water rights. If the PROJECT
herein described shall give rise to a claim, or cause of action to any holoer
of any water rights because of the interference with such rights by the
operation of the PROJECT, then the WATER COMPANY hereby agrees to indemnify
the STATE to the extent of such claim or cause of action.
15. In constructing or causing the PROJECT to be constructed, the WATER
COMPANY shall comply with the provisions of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act
of 1965 and hereby agrees as follows:
(a) The WATER COMPANY will not discriminate against any employee or
applicant for employment because of race, color, sex, religion,
ancestry, or national origin.
(b) In all solicitations or advertisements for employees, the WATER
COMPANY will state that all qualified applicants will receive
consideration without regard to race, color, sex, religion, ancestry
or national origin.
(c) The WATER COMPANY will send to each labor union or workers
representative notices to be provided, stating the WATER COMPANY'S
responsibilities under the statute.
(d) The WATER COMPANY will furnish such information and reports as
requested by the Anti-Discrimination Division for the purpose of
determining compliance with the statute.
(e) Failure of the WATER COMPANY to comply with the statute, the
rules
and
regulations
promulgated
thereunder
and
this
non-discrimination clause shall be deemed a breach of this contract
and it shall be cancelled, terminated or suspended in whole or in
part.
(f) The WATER COMPANY will include the provisions of Items (a)
through (e) in every subcontract or purchase order (unless exempted
under the statute or rules and regulations) so that such provisions
will be binding upon such subcontractor or vendor.

en
16. If either party to the contract
covenants made herein, the other may give
failure, and if the same shall not be cured
notice, the other may declare the contract
remedies at law for such breach.

violates any of the conditions or
written notice of such breach or
within Ninety (90) days after such
forfeited and may proceed to its

^ f \ « ^
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17. The WATER COMPANY hereby agrees to indemnify and save harmless the
STATE and its officers, agents, and employees from any and all liability in
connection with this agreement, including any and all claims for injury or
death of persons or animals, or for any property loss or damage that may arise
from the construction, maintenance, or operation of the PROJECT.
IB. After the WATER COMPANY shall have paid in full the purchase price,
as defined above, the STATE shall execute such deeds and bills of sale as will
be necessary to revest the same title to the aforesaid property and water
rights in the WATER COMPANY.
19. This agreement, or any part thereof, or the benefits
under this agreement, may not be the subject or any assignment
firm, or corporation, by the said WATER COMPANY, without first
the written consent of the STATE to any such proposed
disposition of this agreement.

to be received
to any person,
having secured
assignment or

20. This agreement shall not become binding upon the STATE until it has
been signed by all persons and agencies required by law, and the STATE shall
not become liable to the WATER COMPANY for any commitments made by the WATER
COMPANY until this agreement has been fully executed.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the State of Utah, acting through the B O A R D OF
RESOURCES, Party of the First Part, has caused these presents to be sionea\
the Chairman and Director of the said BOARD OF WATER RESOURCES by authority of
a resolution of said Board; and the RICHARDS IRRIGATION COMPANY, Party of the
Second Part, has caused these presents to be signed and executed on its behalf
by Marvin L. Widerberg, its President, and Clealon B. Mann, its Secretary, by
authority of a resolution of its Stockholders at a meeting held September 17,
1982.
BOARD OF WATER RESOURCES

RICHARDS IRRIGATION COMPANY

2&
I

' Presioent

p-»J^

Cn airman

director

Secretary

# 7- 0+26 7&3

AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS

Employer laentification No.
Divyision Buoger/'AccountTrreK
APPROVED AS TO FORM: J

APPROVED: ,DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
for Director of Finance

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

On the jt-tf day of 4P/2/L, 1985, personally appeared before
me Roy P. U n e and D. Larry Anoerson, who being duly sworn did say that they
are respectively the Chairman and Director of the BOARD OF WATER RESOURCES,
and that they signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of the said BOARD by
authority of a resolution of said BOARD, and they also acknowledged t o me that_
the said BOARD executed the same.
My Commission Expires: //ax/

/£,

/f&T

STATE OF UTAH
}
County of Salt Lake ) s s
. /

On the.? 22- day of Ci ;i ii '
. 1985, personally appeared before me
'.iMibf'jjn, L. Widerberg and Clealon B. Mann, who being duly sworn did say that
^> th'e'y-.ar* respectively the President and Secretary of the RICHARDS IRRIGATION
v\^COKPWrt' and that they signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of said
D\J£©rpof,ation by authority of a resolution of its Stockholders, and they also
• *'acknowledged to jne that said Corporation executed the same.
/Wc'.\. ~

^^y'Cori&sion' Exp i re s: *-"^. r

6 •, /*> £ £
- 7 -

^.AJ:*

Notary Public
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AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT

This Amendment t o Agreement entered i n t o t h i s &M day o f ^ f f 7 - ? ^ ^ *
1986, by and between t h e S t a t e o f Utah, a c t i n g through t h e BOARD OF WATER
RESOURCES, F i r s t P a r t y , sometimes r e f e r r e d t o herein as t h e STATE, and t h e
RICHARDS IRRIGATION COMPANY, a c o r p o r a t i o n , organized under t h e Laws o f t h e
S t a t e of Utah, Second P a r t y , sometimes r e f e r r e d t o herein as t h e WATER COMPANY:

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, the Parties hereto did on April 4, 1985, enter into a contract
for the construction of a dual sprinkle irrigation system located in Sections
27, 28, 29, 33, and 34, T2S, R1E, SLB&M, under which contract certain water
rights, easements, and rights-of-way were conveyed to the STATE; and
WHEREAS, the bids for the project were higher than the estimated cosl
and the STATE desires to provide, from the Conservation and Development Fund
part of the additional funds required to complete the project; and
WHEREAS, i t i s the desire of the WATER COMPANY to amend the previou
contract with the STATE, for a consideration to be hereinafter provided, fo
the purpose of obtaining part of the additional funds reauired, and as th
Parties are ready willing and able to enter into a contract for such purpose;
NOW THEREFORE, by mutual consent of the Parties, the contract date
April 4 , 1985 i s hereby amended as follows:
1. Paragraphs 5, 9, and 10 of the contract dated April 4 , 1985 ar
hereby deleted and the following paragraphs 5, 9, and 10 substituted.
"5. The STATE agrees to pay to the WATER COMPANY Eighty-Five Percei
(852) of the total cost of constructing the PROJECT, but in no event shall tl
amount paid by the STATE exceed Three Hundred Sixty-One Thousand Doll a'
($361,000.00), which includes the additional Forty Two Thousand Dolla
(342,000.00) provided hereunder, and the WATER COMPANY agrees to pay all cos
in excess of the amount paid by the STATE."
\l HAY £7
ZZUI FT?
KATIE L , DI>
RECORDER* SALT LAr.E COUNT
sTATE Or UTAH HATUS& RE
l i l t li TEHPLE SUITE SIB
C »

M * ****** •* * ^ •

ZC'- PY» LT2Zr*r'*

IPS*
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF * K-b

RESOURCES, Party of the First P V A * V --,
the Chairman and Director of the saic*Bo^L*oF v - .
a resolution of said Board; and the R I C H A R D S I R R T I G \ T 1 O N ° ^ ^
Second Part, has caused these presents to be signed and ex^uCecf
by Marvin L. Widerberg, its Presiaent, and Clea~lon B. Mann, its
authority
of a resolution
of its Stockholders at
hPlri

tf

tT-^t****/*^,^

a

meeting

_ 1QS2.

BOARD OF WATER RESOURCES
I

v.* presToefti
*•••'

!•• S

"

^

r-r- -

Chairman

&fifa>

^

_,s><-L<cu.Secretary
/A, , ^ ^ ^ . > ^

parecror

AVAILABLY OF FUNDS:

87-0426703
Employer laentification No.

> ^ ^ -

•C

Division Budget/Accounting
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

APPROVED: DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE

,4^r»:S
Assistant ^ttorpey General
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

W T T Wfnanrp
ance r

)ss

On the ifjtf
day of ^S&tt&rr^*^'*
1986, personally appeared before
me Roy P. Urie and D. Larry Anoerson, who being duly sworn did say that they
are respectively the Chairman and Director of the BOARD OF-WATER RESOURCES,
and that they signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of the said BOARD by
authority of a resolution of said BOARD, and they also acknowledged to me that
the said BOARD executed the same.
My Commission Expires: ffce//#
STATE OF UTAH
County of SaJ£ La£*

)
)s

S&?T~

s

.0><_ _ ,

On VmJ&tf
day of Jrf&##*f'
, 1986, personally appeared bei
Marvin L. Widerberg and Clealon B. Mann, who being duly sworn did say that
they are respectively the President and Secretary of the RICHARDS IRRIGATION
COMPANY and that they signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of said
Corporation by authority of a resolution of its Stockholders, and they also
acknowledged to me that said Corporation executed the same.

My Commission Expires: /fat//9

J?ZY
- 3 -
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AMENDMENT-" TO AGREEMENT

This Amendment to Agreement entered into this 3D#? day o f ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ €
1 9 # , by and between the State of Utah; acting througn the BOARD OF WATER
RESOURCES, First Party, sometimes referred to herein as the STATE, and the
RICHARDS IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation, organized under the Laws of the
State of Utah, Second Party, sometimes referred to herein as the WATER COMPANY:

WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, the Parties hereto did on April 4, 1985, and September 8, 1985
enter into a contract and an amendment to said contract, respectively, for the
construction of a dual sprinkle irrigation system located in Sections 27, 28,
29, 33, and 34, T2S, R1E, SLB&M, under which contracts certain water rights,
easements, and rights-of-way were conveyed to the STATE; and
WHEREAS, due to unforseen circumstances the cost of the project exceeded
the bid price and additional funds will be recuired for completion, and the
STATE desires to provide part of the additional funds from the Conservation
and Development Fund; and
WHEREAS, i t is the desire of the WATER COMPANY to amend the previous
contract with the STATE, for a consideration to be hereinafter provided, for
the purpose of obtaining part of the additional funds required, and as the
Parties are ready willing and able to enter into a contract for such purpose;
NOW THEREFORE, by mutual consent of the Parties, the contract dated
April 4, 1985 and amended September 8, 1986 is hereby amended as follows:
1 . Paragraphs 5, 9, and 10 of the contract dated April 4, 1985 as
amended September 8, 1986, are hereby deleted and the following paragraphs 5,
9, and 10 substituted.
M

5. The STATE agrees to pay to the WATER COMPANY Eighty-Five Percent
(855b) of the total cost of constructing the PROJECT, but in no event shall the
amount Raid by the STATE exceed Four Hundred Sixty-One Thousand Dollars
(3461,000.00), which includes an additional One Hundred Thousand Dollars
(5100,000.00) provided hereunder, and the WATER COMPANY agrees to pay all
costs in excess of the amount paid by the STATE.11
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the s x ^ i T —
RESOURCES, Party of the First Part, h ^ U u L r v * —
the Chairman and Director of the said BOARD OF WATIR RESOURCC" V ~ —
a resolution of said Board; and the RICHARDS IRRIGATION coMPANY^a^t^VV'^'
Second Part, has caused these presents to be signed and executed on its behalf
by Marvin L. Widerberg, its President, and Clealon B. Mann, its Secretary, by
authority of a resolution of its Stockholders at a meeting
held .S.^mf^r
J7
ltf.
RICHARDS IRRIGATION COMPANY
President
^L.

BOARD OF WATER RESOURCES
Chairman

r^s^

Secretary

,—_

__—.

MBuidQAtoi

// Director
Director
AVAILABILITY 0E FUNDS
V

87-0426703
Employer laentification No.

Division Budget/Accounting
APPROVED:
for Directpr^f Finance
STATE OF UTAH
)
County of Salt Lake ) "
On the 3£>#, day of ££CJE/f£&L
9 1986, personally appeared before
me Roy P. Urie and D. Larry Anderson, who being duly sworn did say that they
are respectively the Chairman and Director of the BOARD OF WATER-RESOURCES,
and that they signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of the said BOARD by
authority of a resolution of said BOARD, and they also acknowledged to me that,
the said BOARD executed the same.
My Commission Expires: /fdf

STATE OF UTAH
County of

'9, '900

)
)ss

On thejg*^ day of Dfce«*A&£
t 1986, personally appeared before me
Marvin L. Widerberg and Clealon B. Mann, who being duly sworn did say that '' .
they are respectively the President and Secretary of the RICHARDS IRRIGATION*.COMPANY and that they signed the foregoing instrument in behalf of said . * 2 & ^ — y c^
Corporation by authority of a resolution of its Stockholders, and they alsoh
*\*i*£p&
acknowledged to me that said Corporation executed the same.
*
> -

My Commission Expires t , ^ ^ , 7 ? . /Gfy
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Notary Public
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